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DISTRICTLY SPEAKING:
EVENWEL V. ABBOTT AND THE
APPORTIONMENT POPULATION
DEBATE
JOEY HERMAN*
INTRODUCTION
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides in pertinent part: “Representatives shall be apportioned
among the several states according to their respective numbers,
counting the whole number of persons in each state . . . . [T]he basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the
number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male
1
citizens twenty-one years of age in such state.” This portion of the
Fourteenth Amendment, combined with the Equal Protection Clause,
2
has resulted in the “one-person, one-vote” rule. This rule promises
substantial equality of population within any of a state’s voting
3
districts. Federal courts have largely granted the states great
deference in choosing a measure of population that provides the most
4
equal voting districts. Historically, most states have used total
population to satisfy “one-person, one-vote,” but particular
circumstances have warranted use of state citizenship and voter
5
registration to achieve the most equitable apportionments.
Despite the Supreme Court’s previous reticence to define which
population bases are acceptable for state districting, a recent dispute
now before the Court gives it an opportunity to settle once and for all
the nuances and boundaries of the Court’s previous demands for

* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2017.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
5. See, e.g., Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
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6

“substantial equality” in districting. This Commentary will explore
7
Evenwel v. Abbott, a case in which the Supreme Court has an
opportunity to synthesize the “one-person, one-vote” doctrine. The
Court will rule on the constitutionality of Texas’s total population
districting plan and whether it must be replaced with a plan that
8
better distributes registered voters across the state. Part I presents
the factual and procedural background to Evenwel. Part II details the
history of “one-person, one-vote” doctrine under the Equal
Protection Clause and provides a snapshot of current controlling
precedent. Part III briefly outlines the Western District of Texas’s
9
holding before Part IV discusses the arguments raised by the parties.
Finally, Part V argues that the Supreme Court should uphold Texas’s
total population apportionment or else risk frustrating a large portion
of controlling Equal Protection doctrine.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 17, 2011, Texas Governor Rick Perry signed into law a
10
reapportionment plan for state senatorial districts.
That
reapportionment scheme, Plan S148, was eventually challenged in
11
federal district court and struck down for violating the Voting Rights
12
Act of 1965 (VRA). The District Court for the Western District of
Texas required implementation of a new plan ahead of the 2012 state
13
senate elections because Plan S148 failed to achieve preclearance
14
from the District Court for the District of Columbia. That court then
15
implemented Plan S172 for the 2012 state senate elections.

6. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577.
7. 135 S. Ct. 2349 (2015).
8. See id.
9. Because this is a case under the Voting Rights Act, the case was heard by a three-judge
panel of the District Court in the Western District of Texas. The case was directly appealed
from the district court to the Supreme Court.
10. Evenwel v. Perry, No. A-14-CV-335-LY-CH-MHS, 2014 WL 5780507, at *1 (W.D.
Tex. Nov. 5, 2014), prob. juris. noted 135 S. Ct. 2349 (2015).
11. Id.
12. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.) (VRA).
13. Section 5 of the VRA requires all states who previously used unconstitutional voting
tests to ex ante seek and be granted declaratory judgments validating the legality of any votingrelated legislation. 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2012). See also id. § 10303. Texas is subject to this
requirement and failed to achieve such preclearance for Plan S148.
14. Davis v. Perry, 991 F. Supp. 2d 809, 816 (W.D. Tex. 2014).
15. Id. at 817.
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Plan S172 was formulated with the help of the Texas Legislative
Council, a nonpartisan entity tasked with compiling all relevant data
16
for redistricting efforts. The Texas Legislative Council provided the
state legislature with Census and American Community Survey data
relevant to total population, voting age population (VAP), and citizen
17
voting age population (CVAP). Ultimately, Plan S172 divided Texas
18
into thirty-one districts of equal total population. The average
19
deviation for each district from the ideal total population was 8.04%.
On June 21, 2012, the Texas legislature and Governor Perry signed
20
Plan S172 into law as the “official Texas Senate districting plan.”
On April 21, 2014, Texas citizens Sue Evenwel and Edward
Pfenniger filed an action against Governor Perry and Texas Secretary
21
of State Nandita Berry in their official capacities. Evenwel and
Pfenniger alleged that the implementation of Plan S172 violated their
rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
22
Amendment and the “one-person, one-vote” requirement. Both
Evenwel and Pfenniger identify as registered voters who “regularly
23
vote[] in Texas Senate elections and plan[] to do so in the future.” In
their complaint, Evenwel and Pfenniger claimed that their districts
24
were “among the most overpopulated with eligible voters.” Evenwel
and Pfenniger alleged that apportioning districts by equalizing total
population unconstitutionally dilutes their voting power and violates
25
“one-person, one-vote.” Specifically, they claim that total population
equalization renders their votes between 1.41 and 1.84 times less
26
powerful than voters in other districts.

16. See generally TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, DATA FOR 2011 REDISTRICTING IN
TEXAS (Feb. 2011), http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/redist/pdf/Data_2011_Redistricting.pdf.
17. See id.; see also TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL Data for 2011 REDISTRICTING IN
TEXAS—ADDENDUM ON CITIZENSHIP DATA (Feb 2011), http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/redist/
pdf/CitizenshipAddendum.pdf.
18. Evenwel v. Perry, No. A-14-CV-335-LY-CH-MHS, 2014 WL 5780507, at *1 (W.D.
Tex. Nov. 5, 2014).
19. See id. (referencing that, for purposes of state apportionment, ideal total population of
a district is calculated by dividing the state’s total population by the total number of state senate
districts).
20. Davis v. Perry, 991 F. Supp. 2d 809, 817 (W.D. Tex. 2014).
21. Evenwel, 2014 WL 5780507, at *1.
22. Id.
23. Brief for Appellants at 10, Evenwel v. Abbott, No. 14-940 (U.S. July 31, 2015)
[hereinafter Brief for Appellants].
24. Id.
25. Id. at 11–12.
26. Id.
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Evenwel and Pfenniger moved for summary judgment, claiming
that Texas violated the Fourteenth Amendment by neglecting to
apportion state senate districts without considering some form of
27
voter population. Concurrently, Texas filed a motion to dismiss
claiming that “there was no legal basis for Plaintiff’s claim that Plan
S172 is unconstitutional for not apportioning districts pursuant to
28
Plaintiff’s proffered scheme.” A three-judge panel on the District
Court for the Western District of Texas granted the Defendants’
motion and dismissed Evenwel and Pfenniger’s claims with
29
prejudice. An appeal of the district court’s decision followed, and the
30
Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on May 26, 2015.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Justiciability of State-Level Districting Schemes
The United States Constitution protects all qualified voters’ right
31
to vote. Moreover, all such voters have the constitutionally protected
32
right to have their votes counted. Despite these pronouncements, the
Supreme Court did not recognize the federal judiciary’s ability to rule
33
on allegations of vote “debasement or dilution” until 1962. That year,
the Supreme Court declared that claims of vote dilution arising out of
a state’s districting scheme for in-state elections were federally
34
justiciable. In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court declared that cases
of state-level vote dilution should not be subject to ad hoc policy
formulations of local courts, but instead fall within the scope of the
35
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. A court’s task in
such a case is to “determine, if . . . a discrimination reflects no policy,
36
but [rather] simply arbitrary and capricious action.” Since Baker, the
Supreme Court has consistently used the “judicially manageable

27. Evenwel v. Perry, No. A-14-CV-335-LY-CH-MHS, 2014 WL 5780507, at *1 (W.D.
Tex. Nov. 5, 2014).
28. Id.
29. Evenwel, 2014 WL 5780507, at *4.
30. See Evenwel v. Abbott, 135 S. Ct. 2349 (2015).
31. Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
32. United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1933).
33. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
34. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
35. Id. at 226.
36. Id.
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standards” of the Equal Protection Clause to analyze districting and
37
reapportionment disputes.
B. “One-Person, One-Vote”
After Baker held that courts could review state-level districting
schemes, the Court provided very little guidance as to the exact
38
standards state legislatures should follow. Subsequently, in Gray v.
Sanders, the Court offered some guidance by demanding that all
participants in state elections have “an equal vote—whatever their
race, whatever their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their
39
income, wherever their home may be in that geographical unit.” In
Gray, the Court faced the question of the constitutionality of
40
Georgia’s county unit system, by which an entire county’s votes
would be awarded to the candidate that carried the majority in that
41
particular county. The Court concluded that the system was
unconstitutional because it rendered an entire class of votes valueless
if they were not cast for the candidate that carried the majority in
42
their county.
Gray was the first decision in which the Court required voting
equality to reflect “[t]he conception of political equality . . . [as]
43
mean[ing] one thing—one person, one vote.” Although the Court
emphatically articulated the notion of “one-person, one-vote,” it
would subsequently issue a caveat recognizing the incompatibility of
44
state and federal-level districting analyses. Thus, in its next state
districting case, the Supreme Court articulated its “judicial focus” as
necessarily a fact-specific inquiry into “whether there has been any
discrimination . . . which constitutes an impermissible impairment” on
45
the right to vote.

37. Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533, 557 (1964).
38. Id. at 556.
39. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963).
40. The county unit system is properly analogized as a state-level implementation of the
Electoral College system for federal Presidential elections.
41. See generally Gray, 372 U.S. 368.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 381.
44. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560 (1964) (holding that “the federal analogy [is]
inapposite and irrelevant to state legislative districting schemes”).
45. Id. at 561.
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C. “One-Person, One-Vote” in Reynolds v. Sims
In Reynolds v. Sims, the Supreme Court held that “the Equal
Protection Clause requires both houses of a state legislature to be
46
apportioned on a population basis.” Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Warren Burger advocated a nuanced balancing of existing
47
districting precedent and ordinary notions of equality. While the
Court took notice of states’ need to “rationally consider factors other
than population in apportioning legislative representation,” it held
that the “domain of state interest” must never be used as an
48
“instrument for circumventing a federally protected right.” In other
words, the Court would never tolerate anything less than “an honest
and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its
49
legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable.” The
Court did, however, admit the “practical impossibility [of arranging]
legislative districts so that each one has an identical number of
50
residents, or citizens, or voters.”
The Supreme Court also took notice of the impracticability of
51
holding all state legislatures to the same standard. The Court
clarified that each state’s “overriding objective must be substantial
equality of population among the various districts, so that the vote of
any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other
52
citizen in the State.” Chief Justice Burger reasoned that “[s]o long as
the divergences from a strict population standard are based on
legitimate considerations,” the Constitution allows states to
53
accomplish substantial equality by “whatever” means. Finally, the
Court interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to require such
reapportionment to occur every ten years after the release of the
54
decennial census population statistics.
46. Id. at 576.
47. Id. at 561 (framing the question presented as the need to “ascertain, in the instant
cases, whether there are any constitutionally cognizable principles which would justify
departures from the basic standard of equality among voters in the apportionment of seats in
state legislatures”).
48. Id. at 566 (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960)).
49. Id. at 577.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 578 (“[W]hat is marginally permissible in one State may be unsatisfactory in
another, depending on the particular circumstances of the case.”).
52. Id. at 579.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 583 (reasoning that decennial reapportionment “appears to be a rational
approach to readjustment of legislative representation in order to take into account population
shifts and growth”).
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D. Burns and the First True Test of Reynolds’s “Substantial Equality”
The Court used Reynolds’s “substantial equality” analysis to
determine the constitutionality of a Hawaii districting scheme
designed to remedy large variations in total population and voting
55
registration. In Burns v. Richardson, the Hawaiian State Legislature
adopted a districting plan based on voting registration statistics after a
district court ordered that the state’s pre-existing geography-based
56
districting scheme be abandoned. Hawaii used voting registration
figures to allay fears that a total population regime would bestow an
57
unfair advantage upon the district of Oahu. Oahu was heavily
populated with unregistered military personnel and tourists, which
resulted in a six percent disparity between total population (79% of
Hawaii’s total population) and voter registration (73% of registered
58
voters in Hawaii).
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the voting registration
scheme by restating the comprehensive analysis mandated by
Reynolds and reinforcing the importance of measured judicial
59
deference. The Court declared that review must “consider the
scheme as a whole” so as to allow “the body creating an
apportionment plan in compliance with a judicial order [to be] left
60
free to devise proposals for apportionment on an overall basis.” The
Court expanded upon Reynolds’s “substantial equality” standard by
declaring that “a State’s freedom of choice to devise substitutes for an
apportionment plan found unconstitutional either as a whole or in
part, should not be restricted beyond the clear commands of the
61
Equal Protection Clause.”
Of paramount importance in Burns was Equal Protection Clause
precedent that had established safeguards against “invidious
62
discrimination.” Districting schemes violate the prohibition on
invidious discrimination “only if it can be shown that designedly or
otherwise, a multi-member constituency apportionment scheme . . .
would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91–92 (1966).
Id. at 77.
Id. at 90.
Id.
Id. at 83.
Id.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 88–89.
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63

or political elements of the voting population.” The plaintiff has the
burden to offer “evidence in the record,” rather than mere
speculation, to prove that “districting was designed to have or had the
64
invidious effect necessary.” Without evidence of such invidiousness,
“[t]he decision to include or exclude any such group involves choices
about the nature of the representation with which [the Supreme
Court has] been shown no constitutionally founded reason to
65
interfere.”
The Court acknowledged that Reynolds analyzed a total
population regime, but “the Equal Protection Clause does not require
the States to use” total population instead of voter or citizen
66
population. Rather, the Court merely surmised that total population
was typically the most stable metric for accomplishing voting
67
equality. To this end, the Court identified “an additional problem”
associated with districting regimes that rely on “a registered voter or
68
actual voter basis.” Not only are voter-based metrics subject to
quirks of a state’s own citizenship criteria, but they are also heavily
69
influenced by volatile trends in political activity. Considering the
Reynolds requirement that states redistrict every ten years, votingbased metrics have the potential to differ greatly each year depending
on the existence of controversial election issues, on highly popular
70
candidates, or even on unusual weather.
As a result, the Court cautiously held that the registered voter
basis for reapportionment satisfied the Equal Protection Clause on
these specific facts because “it was found to have produced a
distribution of legislators not substantially different from that which
71
would have resulted from the use of a permissible population basis.”

63. Id. at 88 (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)). See also Pers. Adm’r of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) (holding that the Equal Protection clause and its
prohibition on invidious discrimination requires evidence of a discriminatory purpose that belies
selection or reaffirmation of “a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of’ not
merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group”).
64. Burns, 384 U.S. at 88.
65. Id. at 92.
66. Id. at 91.
67. See id. at 92–93.
68. Id.
69. Id. (remarking that registered voter and actual voter measurements are “susceptible to
improper influences by which those in political power might be able to perpetuate
underrepresentation of groups constitutionally entitled to participate in the electoral process”).
70. Id. at 93 (quoting Ellis v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 352 F.2d 123, 130 (4th Cir.
1965)).
71. Id.
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Voter registration was permissible solely because it “was chosen as a
72
reasonable approximation of both citizen and total population.”
Ultimately, the Court concluded its opinion by clarifying that Burns
must not “be understood as deciding that the validity of the registered
voters basis as a measure has been established for all time or
73
circumstances.”
E. Current “One-Person, One-Vote” Doctrine for State Districting
Reynolds and Burns may be the most prominent “one-person,
one-vote” cases, but other federal decisions inform the Supreme
74
Court’s current standards for apportionment equality. In the 1973
75
case Mahan v. Howell, the Court emphatically foreclosed any
applicability of federal apportionment equality tests to state-level
76
districting schemes. Later, in Gaffney v. Cummings, the Supreme
Court substantiated the state-federal distinction when it upheld a
Connecticut scheme by using Reynolds doctrine as applied in Burns
rather than the “more stringent standards” applied to federal
77
districting disputes.
In state-level districting cases, not all deviations from perfect
population equality make out prima facie equal protection
78
violations. Instead, judicial intervention is reserved for cases of
substantial vote dilution to keep the task of reapportionment within
79
the realm of state legislatures. Not only was the Court concerned
about “making the standards of reapportionment so difficult to satisfy
that the reapportionment task is recurringly [sic] removed from
legislative hands” but it also addressed the possibility that such high
standards would allow “plaintiffs who may have wholly different goals
from those embodied in the official plan” to abuse the fact that equal
80
protection challenges could be brought with ease.

72. Id.
73. Id. at 96.
74. See Evenwel v. Perry, No. A-14-CV-335-LY-CH-MHS, 2014 WL 5780507, at *2–4
(W.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2014).
75. 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
76. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
77. See id. at 741 (alluding to both Mahan and Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531
(1969), where the Court held that “one-man, one-vote” for federal apportionment requires that
population variances be unavoidable despite a good faith effort to cure them).
78. Id. at 743.
79. Id. at 749.
80. Id.
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81

In Brown v. Thomson, the Supreme Court solidified its objective
test for determining which population equality deviations established
prima facie cases for equal protection violations and thus warranted
82
adequate justification by state governments. Ideal population of a
district is to be calculated by dividing the state’s total population by
83
the total number of state senate districts. The Court determined that
any deviation less than ten percent from the ideal population for a
84
given district would be considered “minor.”
Following Thomson, two notable cases in the Ninth and Fifth
Circuits provided additional perspectives for analyzing violations of
85
the Equal Protection Clause’s “one-person, one-vote” rule. In Garza
v. County of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit interpreted Reynolds and
its progeny to require use of total population equality among
86
districts. Garza is also notable for Justice Alex Kozinski’s vehement
dissent against the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment requires
representational (population-based) rather than electoral (voting87
based) equality. Justice Kozinski reasoned that although the choice
to use total population is usually not problematic, voting registration
88
metrics must be used when there is any imbalance of voting power.
Ten years later, the Fifth Circuit ruled on Chen v. City of Houston,
which posed similar questions of vote dilution. Unlike the Ninth
Circuit, the Fifth Circuit in Chen interpreted Reynolds and its progeny
to allow for districting that provided for representational and
electoral equality so long as there was a good faith effort to avoid
89
substantial vote dilution. The Chen court reasoned that a decision to
require use of a citizenship-based metric such as CVAP might
foreclose the opportunity (which is not prohibited in the
Constitution) for state legislatures to exercise their right to extend the
90
right to vote to aliens.

81. 462 U.S. 835 (1983).
82. See id. at 852 (describing the Court’s test).
83. Id. at 842.
84. Id. at 842–43; see also Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977).
85. Chen v. City of Hous., 206 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2000); Garza v. Cty. of L.A., 918 F.2d 763
(9th Cir. 1990).
86. 918 F.2d at 774 (discussing the need for individuals in more populous areas to have
equal access to their state government).
87. See generally id. at 778–88 (Kozinski, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. Id. at 780–81.
89. Chen, 206 F.3d at 524.
90. Id. at 523.
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III. HOLDING
The Western District of Texas dismissed Evenwel and Pfenniger’s
suit, finding that they failed to state a claim that Plan S172 violated
91
the Equal Protection Clause’s “one-person, one-vote” rule. The court
confined its analysis to the issue of whether the plan achieved
“substantial equality of population among districts when measured
92
using a permissible population base.” Because Evenwel and
Pfenniger chose not to allege “the apportionment base employed by
Texas involves a choice the Constitution forbids,” the court held that
it lacked the authority to invalidate Plan S172 on the grounds that “it
does not achieve equality as measured by [Evenwel and Pfenniger’s]
93
chosen metric.” The court reasoned that such a theory had “never
94
before [been] accepted by the Supreme Court or any circuit court.”
The relevant constitutional principle was framed as “whether to
include or exclude groups of individuals ineligible to vote from an
95
apportionment base.” Consequently, the court read Burns v.
Richardson to require deference to the choices made by the state
legislature in the absence of a constitutionally forbidden act of
96
discrimination.
IV. ARGUMENTS
A. Arguments of Evenwel and Pfenniger
Appellants Evenwel and Pfenniger frame their argument by
asking “whether the one-person, one-vote principle of the Fourteenth
Amendment creates a judicially enforceable right ensuring that the
97
districting process does not deny voters an equal vote.” Evenwel and
Pfenniger argue that the lower court’s ruling is entirely irreconcilable
with a determination that “one-person, one-vote” protects the right of
98
individuals to have an equal vote. If the Supreme Court does not
find that Plan S172 violates this principle, it is argued that “the Texas
Legislature could have adopted a Senate map containing 31 districts

91. Evenwel v. Perry, No. A-14-CV-335-LY-CH-MHS, 2014 WL 5780507, at *4 (W.D.
Tex. Nov. 5, 2014).
92. Id. at *2.
93. Id. at *2–3.
94. Id.
95. Id. at *4 (quoting Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92 (1966)).
96. Id.
97. Brief for Appellants, supra note 23, at i.
98. Id. at 3.
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of equal total population without violating the one-person, one-vote
rule—even if 30 of the districts each contained one eligible voter and
99
the 31st district contained every other eligible voter.”
Evenwel and Pfenniger argue that the districts created by Plan
S172, “while roughly equal in terms of total population, were grossly
100
malapportioned in terms of eligible voters.” They provided figures
that show that if CVAP, Total Voter Registration, and Non-Suspense
Voter Registration (total registration minus voters who failed to
respond to a confirmation of residence notice) are used, Plan S172
101
produces districts that deviate from the ideal district by a value of
102
between 45.95% and 55.06%. As a result, Evenwel and Pfenniger
allege that their votes have been diluted compared to the average
103
citizen by a factor of between 1.41 and 1.84.
Drawing heavily from Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims,
Evenwel and Pfenniger fear that an affirmation of the lower court’s
holding will result in “the choice of a population base [being]
104
unreviewable no matter how much vote dilution it causes.” In
general, they do not oppose the choice to use total population as a
basis for reapportionment, but when eligible voters are not given
equal voting power “demographic data that ensures the vote of any
citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen in
105
the State must be used.” Accordingly, Evenwel and Pfenniger
adamantly oppose the lower court’s decision to give deference to the
106
Texas legislature. While the legislature should be afforded the
ability to consider factors such as integrity of political subdivisions,
political compactness, and even representational equality (ability of
non-voters to access government), Evenwel and Pfenniger maintain
that population of eligible voters must be given controlling
107
consideration. It follows that Evenwel and Pfenniger allege that the
lower court’s refusal to overturn Plan S172 reflects a failure to

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 8.
See supra note 19 (explaining how deviation from the ideal is calculated).
See Brief for Appellants, supra note 23, at 9.
Id. at 11–12.
See id. at 14; see discussion supra Section II.A.
Id. at 15 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964)).
See id at 14; see discussion supra Section II.A.
Id. at 18.
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address a plainly justiciable constitutional claim under Baker and
108
Reynolds.
Evenwel and Pfenniger also oppose the lower court’s
109
interpretation of Burns v. Richards. Unlike the lower court, Evenwel
and Pfenniger believe that Burns advocates for use of an alternative
population base even if total district populations do not deviate by
110
more than the required ten percent. In other words, Evenwel and
Pfenniger argue that every districting review must account for
population deviations when measured using CVAP and other
111
registered voter bases. Thus, even if the average total population
deviation from ideal is below ten percent, deviations resulting from
voting-based metrics that exceed that threshold are per se
112
unconstitutional and illustrative of the absence of good faith.
Evenwel and Pfenniger recognize that Burns allowed the use of a
registered voter base for reapportionment only because it
substantially mimicked what the outcome would have been if a
113
citizenship-based metric were used. Nevertheless, they draw on
Chen v. City of Houston and Judge Kozinski’s dissent in Garza v.
County of Los Angeles to illustrate the context in which the current
114
case arises.
Just as the circumstances in Burns warranted
apportionment according to registered voters, the Supreme Court is
urged to accept that “eligible voters will frequently track the total
115
population evenly.” Mandating that Texas redraw districts according
to CVAP, total voter registration, or non-suspense voter registration
ensures that “the Court’s primary concern [of] equalizing the voting
116
power of electors” is fulfilled.
Evenwel and Pfenniger urge the Supreme Court to fashion a
decision recognizing that “requiring the States to apportion
approximately the same number of eligible voters to each district is
117
the only way to enforce that constitutional right.” Extending the

108. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 23, at 19. See discussion supra Section II.A.
109. Id. at 15–17. See also id. at 32–37.
110. Id. at 16.
111. Id. at 34–37.
112. Id. at 18.
113. Id. at 27–28.
114. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 23, at 27–28.
115. Id. at 28 (quoting Chen v. City of Hous., 206 F.3d 502, 525 (5th Cir. 2000)).
116. Id. at 27 (quoting Garza v. Cty. of L.A., 918 F.2d 763, 782 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
117. Id. at 19.
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judiciary’s lens through which it seeks out gross deviations that
violate “one-person, one-vote” is the only way to ensure “some outer
limit to the magnitude of the deviation that is constitutionally
118
permissible even in the face of the strongest justifications.” Allowing
Plan S172 to continue as the current redistricting plan would ensure
that Texas would be rewarded for giving “no consideration to voter
119
equality.”
B. Arguments of Texas
Texas frames its argument by asking “whether the three-judge
district court correctly held that the ‘one-person, one-vote’ principle
under the Equal Protection Clause allows states to use total
population, and does not require states to use voter population, when
120
apportioning state legislative districts.” Texas views any challenge to
Plan S172 as necessarily one of invidious vote discrimination under
121
the Equal Protection Clause. Evenwel and Pfenniger must therefore
prove that Plan S172 resulted from a lack of a good faith effort to
122
equalize districts according to population. Consequently, a failure to
prove irrationality or a purpose of diluting votes must result in an
123
affirmation of the lower court.
Citing Reynolds v. Sims and Brown v. Thomson, Texas first
establishes that any challenge to a districting scheme on “one-person,
one-vote” grounds is a justiciable claim so long as the complaining
124
party provides the required proof of invidiousness. Texas contends
that invidiousness must be understood in terms of Equal Protection
precedent that recognizes certain state action will inevitably affect
125
some individuals differently than others. Therefore, invidiousness
only exists when the difference in treatment is the result of a decisionmaker seeking out the particular outcome to achieve adverse effects
126
for an identifiable group. Texas adamantly contends that Evenwel

118. Id. at 49 (quoting Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 849–850 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring)).
119. Id. at 50.
120. Brief for Appellees at (i), Evenwel v. Abbott, No. 14-940 (U.S. Sept. 18, 2015)
[hereinafter Brief for Appellees].
121. Id. at 10.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1–2.
124. Id. at 10–11.
125. Id. at 16–17.
126. Brief for Appellees, supra note 120, at 16–17 (quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
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and Pfenniger have failed to allege with specificity any such intention
127
on behalf of the State.
Next, Texas contends that a showing of a good faith effort to
equalize total, citizen, or voting-eligible populations can effectively
128
rebut any claimed invidiousness. Texas uses Burns to support the
proposition that the judiciary has historically been hesitant to
interfere with legislative decisions regarding reapportionment of state
129
voting districts. Given the abundance of policy outcomes states must
consider when redrawing districts, the courts have accepted use of
both total population or citizen population so long as arbitrariness,
130
irrationality, or invidiousness are not present. Furthermore, Texas
contends that the Supreme Court’s allowance for voting population in
Burns does not “cast[] doubt on the validity of total population as a
131
permissible apportionment base.” Rather, the Court in Burns
accepted voter population solely on the grounds that it substantially
mimicked the effect of an otherwise permissible population base
132
(such as total or citizen population). Texas suggests that the decision
to use total population rather than voter registration statistics was
entirely rational considering the “additional problem” of political
133
volatility.
Texas also argues that Plan S172’s use of total population does not
substantially dilute the votes of its citizens and therefore does not
134
require a complete change in the “one-person, one-vote” rule. First,
Texas places Plan S172 in the context of the ten percent rule for total
135
population deviations from the ideal district. It is submitted that
requiring use of alternative bases for apportionment whenever nontotal population deviations exceed ten percent would be both
136
practically and substantively wrong. Texas posits that “[s]tates
typically apportion their legislative seats based on total population,”
to the extent that “line-drawers across the nation rely almost
137
uniformly on total population.” Here, Plan S172’s average deviation
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 17–18.
Id. at 18; see discussion supra Part II.
Id. at 21–23.
Id.
Brief for Appellees, supra note 120, at 23.
Id. at 22–23.
Id. at 22.
See discussion supra Section II.B.
Id. at 26–28.
See id. at 28–31.
Brief for Appellees, supra note 120, at 28 (quoting J. Fishkin, Weightless Votes, 121
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from ideal voting districts based on total population is only 8.04%, a
figure similar to the one that the Supreme Court summarily declared
138
insubstantial in Gaffney v. Cummings. Additionally, Texas points to a
non-exhaustive list of fourteen Supreme Court decisions as evidence
that total population, and its accompanying ten percent deviation test,
has been the controlling “one-person, one-vote” metric since the
139
Court first examined the issue.
Texas argues that the importance of total population equality
results in the principle “that [s]tates cannot subordinate population
140
equality to other concerns when apportioning.”
Historically
speaking, “if a [s]tate creates districts of substantially equal
population, it has generally satisfied the Equal Protection Clause and
141
cannot be charged with invidious vote dilution.” Texas interprets
Reynolds to accept good faith efforts to reapportion based on total
142
population, citizen population, or voter population. Texas suggests
that a Supreme Court decision to strike down Plan S172 would break
from overwhelming Supreme Court precedent that has never
considered a good faith effort to equalize total population as
143
constitutionally infirm. Texas even maintains that while total
population equality is not a constitutional requirement, the history of
the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that the Framers of that
144
Amendment favored it over strict electoral equality. Thus, while
Texas is careful to agree that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Garza
mandating total population equality is not doctrinally correct, it
correctly supports the notion that the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment at least accepted that representational equality was a
145
major factor in state districting decisions.
Finally Texas directly attacks the apportionment methods
146
Evenwel and Pfenniger urge the Supreme Court to support. Texas

YALE L.J. 1888, 1890 (2012)). See also id. at 1a–46a (displaying the statutes for the majority of
states that use total population to reapportion their districts every ten years).
138. Id. at 26–27.
139. Id. at 29–31.
140. Id. at 34.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 38.
143. Brief for Appellees, supra note 120, at 38–39.
144. Id. at 40–41 (referencing the Fifth Circuit’s discussion in Chen of evidence suggesting
that a proposed draft of the Fourteenth Amendment that required electoral equality was
rejected by the Framers, 206 F.3d at 527).
145. Id. at 41–42.
146. Id. at 55–57.

HERMAN FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

3/8/2016 3:45 PM

DISTRICTLY SPEAKING: THE APPORTIONMENT POPULATION DEBATE

225

argues that, insofar as Evenwel and Pfenniger suggest abandonment
of total population, their suggested alternatives are too varied to
warrant a Supreme Court order mandating use of CVAP, voter
147
registration, or non-suspense voter registration. The range of voting
strength deviations according to CVAP, voter registration, and non148
suspense voter registration is itself ten percent. This constitutionally
significant discrepancy should in and of itself be enough to trigger
149
judicial suspicion. In any event, Texas maintains that there is a
dearth of evidence regarding any lack of a good faith effort behind
150
the implementation of Plan S172.
V. ANALYSIS
Evenwel v. Abbott presents the Supreme Court’s first opportunity
to define exactly what type of population equality the Equal
Protection Clause requires states to use for districting and to
determine whether the Court’s historically deferential rulings are still
good law. Despite the superficially convincing statistical arguments
provided by Evenwel and Pfenniger, their constitutional claim must
fail. The Equal Protection Clause requires a successful “one-person,
one-vote” claim to be accompanied by evidence that either proves an
invidious intent to dilute votes or undermines the notion of a state
government’s good faith effort to equalize voting power. Evenwel and
Pfenniger have failed to provide either. Additionally, mandating the
use of the voting statistics proffered by Evenwel and Pfenniger will
result in the type of arbitrary administration the Equal Protection
Clause is supposed to protect against. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court should affirm the lower court’s ruling and uphold Plan S172 as
satisfactory under the “one-person, one-vote” doctrine. A contrary
ruling would defy established Equal Protection Clause doctrine and
leave the important issue of state reapportionment in uncharted
judicial waters.
A. Evenwel and Pfenniger Do Not Provide Sufficient Evidence To
Prove a Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
First, Evenwel and Pfenniger summarily fail to assert that Texas
purposely singled out a particular, identifiable group of individuals for
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 55.
Id.
Brief for Appellees, supra note 120, at 55–56.
Id. at 56–57.
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vote dilution. Instead, they merely claim that their particular voting
districts had been treated differently than other districts when
151
analyzed using three voting-based metrics. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has previously only accepted one of the voting-based
frameworks through which Evenwel and Pfenniger advance their
152
argument, and on an extremely limited basis. Even if each of the
three voting-based metrics volunteered by Evenwel and Pfenniger
were constitutionally permissible, the Equal Protection Clause only
153
protects against purposeful discrimination. There is simply no
evidence that Texas purposefully chose to apportion its districts in a
manner that diluted the votes of Evenwel and Pfenniger’s respective
districts.
Evenwel and Pfenniger also argue that Plan S172 must be
invalidated because it could hypothetically allow the Texas
Legislature to adopt “a Senate map containing 31 districts of equal
total population without violating the one-person, one-vote rule––
even if 30 of the districts each contained one eligible voter and the
154
31st district contained every other eligible voter in the State.” This
argument fails because it is exactly the type of speculative evidence
155
the Supreme Court explicitly rejected in Burns. Furthermore, this
reasoning is troublesome because it disregards the second portion of
the “one-person, one-vote” Equal Protection test that requires a good
156
faith effort to equalize a permissible population base.
Just as Evenwel and Pfenniger have failed to satisfactorily allege
an invidious purpose behind Plan S172, they have failed to provide
substantial evidence to undermine Texas’s assertion that the plan
represents an honest and good faith effort to create fair districts.
Aside from the evidence illustrating Plan S172’s deviations from the
ideal in terms of their hand-picked voting-based metrics, the only
other attempt to undermine the good faith behind Plan S172 is a set
of conclusory statements regarding the capability to create more
151. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 23, at 11–12.
152. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 93 (1966) (declaring that use of registered voters for
Hawaii’s apportionment plan satisfies the Equal Protection Clause “only because on this record
it was found to have produced a distribution of legislators not substantially different from that
which would have resulted from the use of a permissible population basis”).
153. See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
154. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 23, at 2–3.
155. 384 U.S. at 88–89 (“Speculations do not supply evidence that the multi-member
districting was designed to have or had the invidious effect necessary to a judgment of the
unconstitutionality of the districting.”).
156. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964).
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157

equal districts. According to Evenwel and Pfenniger, there are
“many feasible ways” to “minimize” both total population deviations
158
and CVAP deviations. Unfortunately, the actual figures of these
alternate plans were not presented to the legislature nor were they
159
appended to Evenwel and Pfenniger’s brief.
Instead, these
conclusory statements were provided in the form of a demographer’s
160
two-page sworn statement. Without proof of invidious dilution or
substantial evidence undermining the good faith of the state
legislature, the 8.04% average deviation from ideal total population of
Plan S172 must be understood as constitutionally minor and
161
consonant with the Equal Protection Clause.
B. Requiring Reapportionment Based on Voting-Based Statistics May
Result in Arbitrary, Irrational Administration of the “One-Person,
One-Vote” Principle.
If the Supreme Court were to rule in favor of Evenwel and
Pfenniger and require states to “apportion approximately the same
162
number of eligible voters to each district,” the Court would
necessarily rely on a body of statistical evidence that is both volatile
163
and difficult to ascertain. The Supreme Court has recognized the
difficult problems posed by voter-based reapportionment and has
even characterized state voter registration policies as a threat to
164
perpetuate the “ghost of malapportionment.” For the Supreme
Court to order every state to apportion its districts according to voter
registration statistics would be to put electoral equality at the mercy
of “fortuitous factors as a peculiarly controversial election issue, a
165
particularly popular candidate, or even weather considerations.”
Also, a Supreme Court mandate to reapportion according to even
CVAP would require reliance on a body of data that is far from
reliable. The Supreme Court has previously lauded census data as the
166
most reliable indicator of population. On the other hand, citizenship
157. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 23, at 46.
158. Id.
159. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 120, at 5–6.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 8.
162. Id. at 19.
163. See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 93 (1966) (quoting Ellis v. Mayor & City Council
of Balt., 352 F.2d 123, 130 (4th Cir. 1965)).
164. Id. at 92–93 (quoting Buckley v. Hoff, 243 F. Supp. 873, 876 (D. Vt. 1965)).
165. Id. at 93 (quoting Ellis, 352 F.2d at 130).
166. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 528 (1969). See also Karcher v. Daggett 462 U.S.
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data was not included on the most recent Federal Census. In fact,
citizenship data is provided by the American Community Survey, a
90% confidence-level estimation of citizenship based on a sample of
168
two million interviews per year. While citizenship is indeed a
permissible population base with which to draw districts,
extrapolating an additional subpopulation of voting-aged citizens
surely compounds the existing risks. It follows that a decision to
abandon the total population formula used almost uniformly by
169
states in favor of either registered voters or voting-aged citizens
would itself be an irrational, arbitrary choice.
CONCLUSION
Evenwel v. Abbott provides the Supreme Court an opportunity to
examine a very provocative Equal Protection issue. Unfortunately for
Evenwel and Pfenniger, there is too much established precedent that
raises the standards for successful “one-person, one-vote” challenges
far above the evidence they have provided. History weighs on the side
of allowing states to choose which populations they wish to use to
formulate their voting districts. Therefore, proof of questionably
disparate treatment of two districts in Texas does not warrant the
dismantling of historically coherent Equal Protection doctrine.

725, 738 (1983) (declaring that “the census data provide the only reliable—albeit less than
perfect—indication of the districts’ ‘real’ relative population levels”).
167. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, UNITED STATES CENSUS 2010 (2009),
https://www.census.gov/2010census/pdf/2010_Questionnaire_Info.pdf.
168. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, A COMPASS FOR UNDERSTANDING AND USING
AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY DATA: WHAT GENERAL DATA USERS NEED TO KNOW 10
(Oct. 2008), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2009/acs/
ACSAIANHandbook.pdf.
169. See Fishkin, supra note 137, at 1890.

